Security

Credential storage and scope

Your API key lives in an owner-only local file — the ~/.aws/credentials posture. Any process running as you can read it, including the agent driving your session. A leaked key is bounded by server-side revocation (analog logout asks the server to revoke it and warns with a manual remedy if that request fails), origin binding (the key refuses to travel to any host but the one it was minted against), and product scope (extraction, feedback, and the shipped key-listing and key-revocation commands).

Network address guard

get and assess accept only http and https top-level URLs. Every fetcher declines localhost and literal IP addresses that are not global unicast by default. Paginated sweeps follow only links on the page’s own host and apply the same guard before each hop.

The local Playwright browser also checks each HTTP, HTTPS, and WebSocket destination made by the rendered page before connecting. This includes redirect hops, client-side navigation, and subresources. It resolves a hostname once per page fetch and requires every returned address to be public. A non-public answer, a failed lookup, or any refused page request fails the whole fetch rather than returning a silently incomplete page.

Reaching a trusted dev server or intranet host on purpose is an explicit opt-in: --allow-private (allow_private=True). That opt-in disables the browser boundary for the page, including its subresources.

This is a request guard, not DNS pinning or operating-system egress isolation. Python evaluates the hostname first, then Chromium resolves it independently when making an allowed request. A hostname that changes between those operations can still select a different address. Do not treat the local browser as a complete sandbox for hostile pages.